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abstract
This article advances a novel way of understanding humor and stand-up comedy. I propose that the relationship between
the comedian and her audience is understood by way of trust, where the comedian requires the trust of her audience for her
humor to succeed. The comedian may hold (or fail to hold) the trust of the audience in two domains. She may be trusted as
to the form of the humor, such as whether she is joking. She may also be trusted as to the content of the joke. This approach
has two distinct virtues. The first is that it makes sense of partial successes. These are cases where the humor neither com-
pletely succeeds nor fails because the audience does not fully trust the comedian. The second is that it explains intuitions
about ethically dubious humor and why certain classes of humor, especially those dealing in racialized and gendered identi-
ties, are more readily (but not necessarily) accepted from humorists of those identities.
i. introduction
Stand-up comedy involves, among other things, a
relationship between the comedian and the au-
dience. The comedian is often not just trying to
get the audience to laugh but to laugh along with
the comedian, or to laugh together at the come-
dian. This imbues stand-up comedy with a social
dynamic where the personage of the comedian
is important. Sometimes the comedian’s person-
age is a created character like with Al Murray
the Pub Landlord, who was created as a satire
of British conservative populism. It can be that
a comedian’s personage is in question owing to
their unethical behavior, as was the case with
Louis C.K. and Shane Gillis. Other times, the
comedian’s personage is the focus of their act,
as with Hannah Gadsby’s Nanette. The various
ways in which a comedian’s personage is impor-
tant shows that an integral part of stand-up com-
edy is the relationship between the comedian
and the audience.
My focus in this article is on one aspect of
this relationship: the audience’s trust of the
comedian. Specifically, I seek to show that the
language of trust can be applied to comedy, and
that this has significant explanatory virtue. Not
only does an analysis of trust elucidate how com-
edy works in a social context, but it also allows
for a deeper understanding of the evaluation
of humor. I discuss this mainly through talking
about trust and humor, since stand-up comedy is
mainly an art of humor.
The first half of this article—Sections ii
through iv—establishes how I am talking about
humor, how I am talking about trust, and how
the two are combined. In the second half of the
article—Sections v through viii—I run through
what I consider to be the most significant im-
plications of looking at comedy through the
lens of trust. I begin by establishing a level of
indeterminacy in humor owing to the fact that
trust is often partially but not totally merited. I
expand this to establish the category of ethically
dubious humor: humor that is ethically valanced
and may be suspected of being ethically vicious
without definitely being ethically vicious. In the
final section I draw to the ultimate implication,
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which is that one of the tasks of the comedian
is making themselves clearly trustworthy to the
audience. This is the ultimate domain of skill in
stand-up comedy: getting the audience to trust
and accept the comedian.
ii. how i am talking about humor
In this article, I discuss humor as a social prac-
tice, which is different from how humor is usu-
ally discussed in analytic philosophy. Humor is
standardly presented as an emotion or some-
thing emotion-like, where it is defined by a cer-
tain sort of cognitive reaction and attendant
phenomenology.1 Such an account is not useful
for discussing trust and humor, so I instead use
what I call a social account of humor. By this
account, humor is understood as a social prac-
tice centered around evoking laughter. The unit
of humor is the humor act (such as a joke, a
gag, or a prank) and comprises up to three roles:
that of the humorist, the audience, and the tar-
get of the humor (what is being “laughed at”).
The roles are nonexclusive, so one person may
play two or even all three roles. All three roles
are also not necessarily present in all cases. For
example, humor centered around puns or other
wordplay does not necessarily feature anything
being laughed at. There is also “found humor,”
which is humor without a humorist. An exam-
ple of this could be seeing someone on the street
slip, fall down, and have their novelty-sized ice
cream land squarely on their head.
One important distinction that I use is that
between “affiliative” and “disaffiliative” laugh-
ter (Glenn 2003, 29–31). This is the distinction
that is colloquially understood as being between
“laughing with” and “laughing at.” Since laugh-
ter is a social signal, it can be used to exercise
power in a group by either including or exclud-
ing individuals or groups. People who are being
invited to laugh affiliatively are either being in-
vited into a group or affirmed as a member of
the group doing the laughing. People who are
being targeted with disaffiliative laughter, who
are being laughed at, are being excluded from
the group that includes the laughers. Since hu-
mor trades in laughter, and laughter may be af-
filiative or disaffiliative, I refer to affiliative and
disaffiliative humor based on whether the laugh-
ter the humor pursues is primarily affiliative or
disaffiliative.
For a humor act to succeed, two things are
necessary. The first criterion is that it must be
sufficiently comprehensible to the audience. If it
is not clear what the point of an attempted joke
is, or if it is not clear that it is a joke at all, then
the joke will suffer and possibly fail completely.
The second criterion is that it must engender par-
ticipation. Participation standardly means getting
the audience to laugh, though there are humor
practices that have developed to pursue other
reactions like groaning or disgust.2 When a hu-
mor act is being evaluated, the audience is be-
ing thought of as a normative audience, whether
the audience actually exists. This means that the
question is not “is there a real group of people
who would laugh at this?” but rather “does this
humor merit laughter?”
Using participation as the standard of success
is also particularly apt for stand-up comedy. This
is because that while stand-up standardly pur-
sues the laughter of the audience, it does not do
so exclusively. This is not only because there is
stand-up that pursues other sorts of humor re-
actions, like the previously mentioned groaning
and disgust reactions, but there is also stand-up
that pursues reactions that are nonhumorous al-
together. Think of all the times a comedian in-
sults a local politician, to the riotous applause of
the audience. While I discuss comedy as pursu-
ing humor, I believe that much of what I write
applies to comedy in general. By using the lan-
guage of participation, what I write may be eas-
ily applied to stand-up as a whole, including that
which pursues nonhumorous aims.
iii. the basics of trust
If I am going to be talking about the role of trust
in the success of stand-up comedy, then I must
provide an account of trust. What follows is an
attempt to give a basic account of trust, which
is to say an account that is copacetic with the
most prominent accounts of trust without forcing
a choice between them.
Trust is standardly understood as being in
terms of “places.” This is to say that there is one-
place trust (where person A is generally trust-
ing), two-place trust (where person A trusts per-
son B), and three-place trust (where person A
trusts person B in some domain P) (Faulkner
2015, 424). Since I must show that an analysis
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of trust can be applied to humor, my discussion
tends toward the three-place analysis; it is by the
third place that it can be established that comedy
uses trust.
Trust generally comprises two distinct parts.
First there is reliance, where A relies on B.
“Reliance” is used in a technical sense here; as
Katherine Hawley writes, “to rely on someone
to x is to act on the supposition that she will x”
(2014, 3). This is somewhat different from the
colloquial use of “reliance,” which often has a
connotation of some power dynamic, and to say
that A relies on B is to say that A is at the mercy
of B, and A requires B to perform some task for
A that A cannot for herself. Importantly, Haw-
ley (2014, 3) notes, under this technical sense of
reliance, relying on someone to x does not mean
believing that she will x. Reliance is about act-
ing, not believing; A could act on the supposi-
tion that B will do some x that A believes B is
very unlikely to do, although that would be ei-
ther foolish or desperate.
Different philosophers delineate the “re-
liance” part of trust in different ways. For ex-
ample, Karen Jones writes that the way A relies
on B in trust is that she has an “attitude of op-
timism” toward the “goodwill and competence”
of B (1996, 4). She explains this to mean that A
anticipates that B will have and display compe-
tence and goodwill in their interactions. Hawley,
instead of focusing on goodwill and optimism,
writes that reliance resides in A’s belief that B
has a commitment to doing something or acting
in some way (2014, 10). Commitments, to Haw-
ley, are normative expectations that most often
(but not necessarily) arise from a combination of
convention and mutual expectation. Zac Cogley
provides a different approach to Jones’s under-
standing of reliance, and writes that in trust A
believes that B will act with goodwill and compe-
tence (2012, 35). Where Jones stresses optimism,
Cogley stresses belief. This means that to Jones,
trust is an affective attitude, whereas to Cogley,
trust is a sort of belief. This distinction, between
affective attitude and belief, is the main point of
contention in defining trust, but it is not relevant
to what I argue in this article, and I am confident
that nothing that I propose cannot be accepted
by a proponent of any one of these approaches.
The second part of trust is largely agreed
upon: however the first piece of trust is under-
stood, that first piece will be a direct and com-
pelling but not indefeasible reason for B act-
ing in accordance with A’s attitude or belief. I
call this part the reflexivity condition. The ex-
act form this part takes depends on how the first
part is formulated. So, to Jones, B is “directly
and favourably moved by the thought that [we]
are counting on her” (1996, 8). In contrast, for
Hawley, B will take having a relevant commit-
ment to be a reason to fulfill that commitment.
The main role of the reflexivity condition is to
separate trust from mere reliance, and this is of-
ten justified with a comparison to relying on a
machine. While one may rely on a machine for
many things (for example, I am relying on one
right now, to write this article), the machine does
not respond to this reliance. It is neither moti-
vated nor affected. The same analysis goes for
other things or processes that are not agents—
the ebb and flow of the tides, the sun coming up
in the morning, and so on. While we may talk
about trusting in a computer, that is considered
to be colloquial talk with no relevance to this
discussion.
iv. mapping trust
Trust may affect how a humor act succeeds (or
suffers) with respect to both that act’s compre-
hensibility and its ability to bring about partici-
pation. I begin by focusing on trust and compre-
hension, where a humor act’s comprehensibility
may be affected by trust in two ways. The first
way is that the audience must trust that what the
would-be humorist is doing is in fact an attempt
at humor. For example, when my uncle leans
across the table to me and asks, “how do you sell
a deaf man a banana?” I am trusting him that he
is beginning a joke and not earnestly asking me
how to sell a deaf man a banana. The reliance
condition is met because I am acting—listening,
interpreting, understanding—on the supposition
that my uncle is joking. I am playing the role of
audience to the joke. The reflexivity condition is
met by my uncle taking my acting as audience
to tell the joke with me as audience.3 How much
the would-be humorist is trusted depends sub-
stantially on how well the audience knows them,
and what the audience thinks of them. I know
my uncle quite well, I know the sorts of things
he talks about, and I know the sorts of jokes he
likes to make, so it is easy for me to trust that
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he is joking when he asks me, “how do you sell
a deaf man a banana?” Were I asked the same
question, in the same tone of voice, by a stranger
on the bus, I would be much less likely to trust
that they were joking. The stranger would have
to do something to build that trust, like ask,
“would you like to hear a joke?” For the joke to
be comprehended, the audience must trust that
the would-be humorist is joking.
Just as it can be unclear whether a putative
humorist is actually joking, it can also be clear
that the humorist is joking but unclear what the
joke is about. Consider an example where my
uncle is making fun of someone for how they
dress, with me as his audience. His target is a
woman wearing an extremely large and oddly
colored designer hat. The content of the joke
depends on whether my uncle is trusted to know
that the hat is specifically a designer hat. If my
uncle does not know that it is a designer hat,
then the joke may just turn on its odd size and
color. If he does know, however, then the joke
may instead turn on any number of things, from
the hat’s high price to the reputation of the de-
signer. The reliance and reflexivity conditions
are met in this example in the same way that
they were in the previous one: I listen, interpret,
and understand my uncle’s joke on the supposi-
tion that he has some knowledge about fashion
designers, and my uncle takes me as his audience
because I make that supposition. Something
worth drawing out is that how much I trust my
uncle in this regard will depend on what sort
of person I consider him to be. I may not know
precisely just what he knows about fashion, but
I may consider him to be the sort of person who
knows something about fashion. This sort of
judgment about what sort of person the humorist
may be thought to be will be important when
discussing ethically dubious humor.
These examples suggest two domains in which
the humorist is trusted: competence and intent.
Competence just means the would-be humorist’s
ability to construct and enact the humor act. In-
tent has to do with what the humorist means, and
what she is attempting to convey. For the sake
of this article, I talk about meaning in the sense
of Gricean reflexive intentions (for A to mean
something is to say that A intends for B to un-
derstand what A means by way of B recogniz-
ing that A intends for B to understand what A
means) since that offers a clear way of talking
about meaning, but I do not believe that any-
thing I write substantively depends on adopt-
ing the Gricean approach to reflexive intentions
(Grice [1957] 1989, 219).
It is important to recognize that trust is not
absolute. I can trust my uncle more or less with
respect to both his competence and his intent.
Since humans have a lot of experience with ba-
sic forms of humor—jokes and mocking being
prime examples—it is rare for people to be to-
tally incompetent in humor. Most people can
construct a joke where it is reasonably clear that
they are joking, and it is reasonably clear what
they mean. At the same time, very few people
are expert enough to be perfectly competent and
clear in intent all the time. Accordingly, with re-
spect to humor, there will often be some trust of
the humorist, but not total trust. Similarly, one
of the goals of the humorist is often to build
the trust of the audience. In a casual setting,
this could be as simple as the earlier example of
“would you like to hear a joke?”
v. trust, intentions, and examples from the
stage
Focusing on intentions through the lens of trust
brings forward an important fact about humor:
what is important is not just what the humorist
intends, but what the audience understands the
humorist to intend. In turn, what the audience
can understand the humorist to intend is limited
by what they believe the humorist to be capa-
ble of intending. It is at this point that the stand-
up comedian begins to be evaluated substantially
differently than the average stranger or acquain-
tance trying to tell a joke, albeit only in degree.
The stand-up comedian will, by default, have
more trust with respect to whether they are jok-
ing. This is because the comedian’s performance
takes place in the context of a show, which
is an institutionalized performance. “Would you
like to hear a joke?” has been implied by the
advertising, the stage, the microphone, and the
introduction.
Even though the comedian is more readily
accepted as trying to be joking, there are still
further questions about what they intend, and
what they might be trusted to intend. There is
not just whether the comedian intends to tell a
joke, but whether he intends to treat that joke’s
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target affiliatively or disaffiliatively, and also how
he conceives of his target. These issues are most
readily brought out in the case of jokes that use
marginalized groups. Consider the work of Rus-
sell Peters, an Indo-Canadian stand-up comedian
who deals in ethnic humor. He makes jokes
concerning the behavior of ethnic minorities,
immigrants, and people of color. (These groups
are often coextensive in his comedy.) Peters is
also extremely popular with people of color. For
example, in his shows he will ask if there are
any Mexicans in the audience (Peters 2006). He
will then single out the respondents and make
jokes concerning Mexican stereotypes and af-
fect a stereotypical Mexican accent. This sort of
humor could easily be considered unacceptably
racist, but it is accepted and specifically accepted
by members of the target communities. Peters
succeeds, I suggest, because he often focuses on
his own upbringing as a racialized immigrant and
how that sets him apart in Canadian society. His
most famous line concerns his heavily accented
father threatening to beat him, often in relation
to Peters trying to follow the lead of a white
friend. Peters gains the audience’s trust by show-
ing deep familiarity with the experience of being
marginalized for being a racialized immigrant.
He is not only trusted to be joking affiliatively
about Mexican immigrants, but he is also trusted
to have a positive conception of Mexicanness.
While the Peters example highlights the sort
of humor that is usually ethically evaluated, the
dynamics of trust hold in more basic cases of
stand-up too. The comedian has to gain the trust
of the audience with respect to her competence
and her character. If the comedian is trying to
joke affiliatively, then the audience has to be
willing to be part of the group of the comedian,
and that means the comedian demonstrating that
they are trustworthy: that they have good inten-
tions, and that they are capable of having good
intentions. I want to turn now to two examples
that show how stand-up comedians manage the
trust of the audience.
v.a. Example 1
Kevin Hart, Laugh at My Pain—The centerpiece
joke of this set is about Kevin Hart making ex-
cuses for not having enough money (Hart 2011).
He recurs it several times through the set, and
returns to it for the closing line. In 2011, Kevin
Hart was not short of money. Even though he
had yet to have his own starring role in a ma-
jor movie, he was already famous and a million-
aire several times over from sales of his previous
comedy sets. A joke about being short of money
could easily come across as condescending from
a millionaire. The majority of the audience of the
show, even for the particular recorded show in
Los Angeles, will never have as much money as
Hart had even then. In this context, what is in-
teresting about Laugh at My Pain is that it be-
gins with a fifteen-minute video introduction of
Hart leading a tour through the working-class
North Philadelphia neighborhood where he grew
up. He intones “come home with me” as the
camera shows not just images of Philadelphia,
but his Philadelphia: running shoes hung over a
telephone wire, and a bookstore advertising that
it ships to prisons. He identifies the corner he
would be dropped off for school, across from a
boarded up and presumably abandoned house.
He sits on the steps to where he used to live and
talks about his mom kicking his dad out of the
house. All of this is intercut with Hart’s child-
hood friends talking about how he had to learn
to be honest, tough, and embrace who he was.
All of this works, I contend, to garner the au-
dience’s trust for when Hart talks about being
short of money. It not only shows that he is jok-
ing affiliatively, but that he conceives of being
short of money in a way that they can accept. He
knows what it is like to be poor. They can trust
him.
v.b. Example 2
Mo’Nique, I Coulda Been Your Cellmate—The
set is delivered to the people imprisoned in
Ohio Reformatory for Women (Mo’Nique 2007).
Some of the humor succeeds strongly, especially
when Mo’Nique displays familiarity with the
dynamics of prison life—for one bit she looks for
the “baddest bitch here” and playfully dismisses
one woman for not being a maximum security
concern—or talks about common experiences
like masturbation and trying to find sexual plea-
sure without a partner. Some of the humor also
fails completely. When Mo’Nique tries to offer
life advice—on how to act morally and how to
succeed—the audience grows quiet and there is
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even a slight feeling of hostility. The spot high-
lights Mo’Nique’s position as highly successful
comedian and actress, and so set her against
the audience. The humor alienates the audi-
ence. That they, prisoners and performer, share
some background may even make the alienation
more acute as the humor, far from encouraging
the audience, underlines to them that their lot
in life is determined as much by luck as just
desserts. The audience has not been won over,
and so the humor fails.
vi. implications: indeterminacy
I believe that looking at humor through the lens
of trust has a number of implications. I begin
with indeterminacy, which I believe is the most
important result of this approach, before moving
on to discuss ethically dubious humor and the
importance of clarity.
Two of the points I have presented in this ar-
ticle are that humor may succeed or fail based
on whether the audience trusts the comedian,
and that trust is not necessarily absolute. If you
put these two points together, you get the re-
sult that there is a level of indeterminacy in en-
gaging with humor: the audience may not have
sufficient knowledge of the comedian’s knowl-
edge, competence, or intentions to completely
trust her. There is also the fact that, as I have ar-
gued, comedy uses trust in multiple domains. A
comedian may be trustworthy in some domains,
but not others. A comedian whose competence
is trustworthy might be untrustworthy in her in-
tent, and vice versa. If trust is often partial, and
the success of humor depends on that trust, then
the success of a comedian’s humor will often be
partial. The audience will react as desired, usu-
ally by laughing, but the reaction will not be
completely wholehearted and unrestrained.
If acts of humor are often partial successes,
then this allows approaches to evaluating hu-
mor to be finessed. Standardly, humor is evalu-
ated to be either funny or not funny. Either it
merits participation, or it does not. The quali-
fied or reticent participation that trust suggests
points to the fact that humor will most often suc-
ceed in degrees. Rather than simply funny or un-
funny, humor is best evaluated along a gradation
of more or less funny. While this result sounds
obvious, and almost platitudinous, it would sug-
gest a revision to most analytic philosophical lit-
erature on humor. Standard accounts of humor,
such as those given by Carroll (2013) or Mor-
reall (2009), focus on spelling out what humor
is. Consequently, they provide for an evaluation
that something either is or is not funny; an object
either is or is not a proper object for amusement.
The approach of trust allows for a second way of
evaluating humor, and one that I suspect is more
fruitful since it fits more readily with evaluations
not only of something being more or less funny,
but with the evaluator being unsure of how to
react. One area where the evaluation of humor
gets more detailed attention is the ethical evalu-
ation of humor, and I turn to that presently.
vii. implications: ethically dubious humor
One of the most prominent debates within the
philosophy of humor is over the ethical evalu-
ation of humor, where the question is usually
taken to be something like the lines of “can
the funniness of a joke be affected by the eth-
ical dimensions of its content?” Authors such
as Carroll (2014a, 2014b), Smuts (2007, 2009,
2010), and Gaut (1998) present arguments over
whether humor can be ethically meritorious or
ethically vicious. The argument I have provided
suggests another ethical category for humor,
which is humor that is ethically dubious. To say
that humor is ethically dubious is to say that the
ethical dimensions of its content, however that
content may be understood, are suspect. There is
a level of ambiguity or indeterminacy as to that
joke’s ethicality.
Given my argument that trust is rarely ab-
solute, most ethically valanced humor will be
dubious to some degree. A comedian’s inten-
tions, and how she conceives of the groups she
is joking about, will often be to some degree
opaque to the audience. What is inside her head
is still inside her head, no matter how good
she is at externalizing her thinking. The point
about how a group is conceived of is particu-
larly relevant: while a comedian can insist that
her intentions are positive (or at least aim to-
ward affiliative or disaffiliative humor as appro-
priate), making clear how she perceives of a
group is more difficult.4 Consider the Peters ex-
ample given above: I can easily imagine a reader
of this article accepting it but still harboring a
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little bit of doubt. The sort of doubt that says, “I
accept what is being said, but nevertheless.”
viii. implications: clarity and difficulty
The persistent dubiety of ethically valanced hu-
mor points to a particular value of good comedy,
which I call clarity. Clarity is not simply straight-
forwardly saying what one means, but rather
constructing and executing a set in such a way
that the comedian’s intentions are as clear as
they can be. As clear as can be with respect to
what is the target of a joke, as clear as can be
with respect to whether a joke is meant affilia-
tively or disaffiliatively, and as clear as can be
with respect to how the comedian conceives of
the various parties within the joke. With stand-
up comedy this can be accomplished a few ways
beyond the scope of the show itself, such as
advertising, themed shows, or a comedian’s re-
puted approach. All else equal, a woman per-
forming the same set about gender roles on a
special show for women in comedy will be more
readily trusted than if she performed that same
set in a nonspecialized context. A comedian ad-
vertised as “a Jewish comedian” will be more
readily trusted to have a positive conception of
Jewishness. The Peters example suggests that his
reputation at the very least gives him leeway to
make fun of Mexican stereotypes. Often, how-
ever, the comedian has to build trust within her
set. She has to convince her audience to come
along with her, believe her, and, critically, partic-
ipate by laughing along as appropriate. Presum-
ably this is how someone like Peters got started:
before he was trusted to make ethnic jokes about
all and sundry, he had to earn that trust. He
earned it in various ways, notably using his own
sets to focus on his experience as a racialized im-
migrant, and how that set him apart from main-
stream Canadian society. In joking about his own
experiences, he allows the audience to trust that
when he jokes about the racialization of other
ethnic groups, he is joking affiliatively, because
he has had those experiences himself. The au-
dience can trust his conception of other ethnic
groups because they trust that Peters conceives
of distance from the Canadian mainstream in a
nonpejorative way.
The contrast between the reception of how
Peters talks about his own experiences and those
of others can be further instructive. When he
talks about his own experiences as an Indo-
Canadian he is afforded a default level of trust
because he has the experiential expertise of be-
ing an Indo-Canadian. When he talks about the
experiences of Mexican Canadians (or Mexican
Americans), that default level of trust is lower
because, while he has the expertise of being
racialized, he does not have the experiential ex-
pertise of being racialized as Mexican. He has to
further earn the trust of the audience through
his sets. Earning the trust of the audience takes
skill. The more the audience’s trust needs to be
earned, the more skill is required of the come-
dian. I suspect that many hold some version of
this point intuitively: particular comedians like
Peters (or Dave Chappelle or Jon Stewart) gain
praise for being able to make jokes about dif-
ficult material. Consider this evidence of an ex-
planatory virtue of the account I have given of
the role of trust in comedy (and humor more
broadly): trust explains not just why ethically
complicated topics are more difficult to joke
about but also why nevertheless there are skilled
comedians who can reliably do so.
This point about difficulty suggests but does
not confirm a further point about the topics of
humor: that the issue with humor about certain
ethically valanced topics like race and gender is
not that these topics are out of bounds for hu-
mor but that they are simply more difficult. The
comedian must do more work to prove herself
trustworthy. I should note that this means that
topics are not necessarily precluded to anyone,
so a man could succeed in making fun of fem-
inine stereotypes, or a white person could suc-
ceed in making fun of racialized blackness, but
the degree of difficulty would be very high. I say
this point is suggested but not confirmed because
there could be further reasons that mean the
degree of difficulty could simply never be met.
However, at least in principle any person may
succeed in joking about any topic if they are suf-
ficiently skilled at earning the audience’s trust.
A virtue of this point is that it makes sense
of two data points concerning group-related hu-
mor. The first is that in the sort of group-related
humor that is usually considered in some way
proprietary for the in-group, there are members
of the in-group who would not be well received
telling such jokes. So, for example, there are
jokes about Jewish conspiracism or kvetchiness
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that I would accept from my family but not from
Stephen Miller. Miller may be Jewish, but ow-
ing to his role in implementing racist violence
backed by an antisemitic logic, I do not trust him
to have a nonpejorative conception of Jewish-
ness. Similarly, as the Peters case shows, there
are people who are readily accepted in making
the sorts of jokes that are normally reserved for
members of an in-group. Peters, Indo-Canadian,
is accepted in making jokes about Mexicanness.
My account of trust makes sense not only of both
cases, but why we hold the intuitions that make
these cases noteworthy. Experiential expertise of
group members creates a basic level of trust, and
this trust is necessary for the joke to succeed. It
is necessary to trust that the comedian has ap-
propriately affiliative or disaffiliative intentions,
and conceives of the relevant groups in accept-
able terms. Trust, however, may be earned or
lost. Miller, through his evil, loses trust. Peters,
through his skill, earns it.
The Peters and Miller examples show the im-
portance of power dynamics in cultivating trust-
worthiness. Specifically, their respective social
positions affect the difficulties they face in mer-
iting the audience’s trust. When Peters talks
about his upbringing as a racialized immigrant,
he evinces his particular, marginalized status
within Canadian society. This marginalized sta-
tus helps the audience trust that he understands
what it is like to be marginalized, and in turn
that he has an appropriate conception of being
marginalized. An equivalent comedian telling an
equivalent joke, but who held a privileged rather
than marginalized status within Canadian soci-
ety, would face a higher degree of difficulty
in building their trustworthiness because they
would not be able to appeal to Peters’ personal
history as a racialized immigrant to make clear
that they had an appropriate conception of be-
ing a racialized immigrant within Canadian so-
ciety. So, a Canadian who would standardly be
racialized as white would not be prohibited from
making the same jokes that Peters does, but they
would face a higher standard of difficulty.
Understanding the relation between social po-
sition and trust also helps further appreciate the
Hart and Mo’Nique examples. The worry that
Hart could come across as condescending is in-
formed by his being rich. His empowered social
position puts distance between him and the au-
dience. Similarly, Mo’Nique has an empowered
social position relative to her audience not just
by virtue of her own success but also by her
audience’s status as prisoners. This distance cre-
ates an elevated level of difficulty, as both Hart
and Mo’Nique need to have the audience ac-
cept their affiliative intentions. In Hart’s case,
the prologue to Laugh at My Pain can be under-
stood as helping Hart make his intentions clear.
Foregrounding his life experiences help show the
life experiences that inform his intentions. Sim-
ilarly, when she discusses common experiences,
part of what Mo’Nique is doing is making clear
to the audience that she conceives of them not
just as prisoners, but as people who are still
women. Altogether, both Hart and Mo’Nique
face the difficulty of the social distance between
them and their audience, and overcome that dif-
ficulty by focusing on what they have in com-
mon with their audience, and through focusing
on those commonalities making clear that they
are capable of having the appropriate sorts of
intentions.
ix. conclusion and coda: authenticity, but not
I have given an account of how humor and
comedy depend on building a trusting relation-
ship between comedian and audience, and I have
elaborated on the account’s implications. Com-
edy depends on building a relationship between
comedian and audience, and the best comedians
are the best at building this relationship. They
demonstrate not only their competence in joke
crafting, but in getting the audience to trust that
they have the right sort of intentions, and that
they are capable of having the right sort of in-
tentions. What comedy demands, then, is the pre-
sentation not just of jokes but of a joke teller, a
human being to which the audience can relate,
and with whom they can participate.
This conclusion suggests a further conclusion,
but one which I want to deflate. If a come-
dian goes up on stage to garner the trust of the
audience then, it follows, the comedian should
be themselves. Be authentic. In the introduction
to Laugh at My Pain, one of Hart’s childhood
teachers recalls giving Hart this advice (Hart
2011). Comedian Andrew Schultz offers similar
advice in a TED Talk (Schultz 2019). If the co-
median is to be trusted by the audience, she
has to be herself, put herself out there so the
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audience can trust her. This is, however, inaccu-
rate. As Yasmin Nair points out in her broadside
against Hannah Gadsby’s stand-up show Nanette,
audiences have expectations for what counts as
authentic (Nair 2019). In the case of being a les-
bian, Nair notes, that means being traumatized.
If the audience understands the essential expe-
rience of being a lesbian as being traumatized—
as Nair makes the case—then earning the audi-
ence’s trust requires incorporating that trauma
into your show, authentic or not. Even authen-
tic trauma has to be given an elevated place, so
that it can define the comedian. The audience
has a say in the trusting relationship, and their
expectations determine how the comedian has to
respond to earn that trust. The comedian must
be seen as authentic, but that is not the same as
being authentic. This can leave the comedian in
a precarious position: either their authentic self
just so happens to line up with what the audience
expects, or she is caught having to fabricate an
inauthentic stage persona just to be accepted as
authentic.
The question of authenticity in comedy is a
large topic and deserves its own treatment, but
discussing trust helps frame one dilemma clearly.
For the purposes of this article it is too much
to solve this dilemma; rather, I present its fram-
ing as an explanatory virtue of engaging comedy
through the lens of trust. The comedian, for her
set to succeed to its fullest, must be trusted by
the audience. To be trusted by the audience re-
quires being seen as authentic. However, to be
seen as authentic can mean meeting the audi-
ence’s preconceptions, and those preconceptions
deviate from the comedian’s authentic self. Ac-
cordingly, the comedian must act inauthentically
to be perceived as authentic.
Perhaps there is a rejoinder here: in the first
section I wrote that I was considering humor
normatively. It could be countered that the real
audience, with their prejudices, is not giving a
normatively sound reaction. For real comedi-
ans in real contexts, authenticity is not enough.
But for the analysis of humor and comedy, the
normatively superior set is the one where the
comedian gets up on stage and is themselves. I
am willing to accept this point, but I think that
Nair’s analysis still holds and is the proper end
point for this article. Stand-up comedy is not
just a practice but an industry, too. The indus-
trial pressures on comedy—to be popular, to be
successful, to be marketable—are understood
by both comedian and audience. Such that they
are understood by the audience, they are an-
other challenge for the comedian to overcome in
proving herself trustworthy: to give the impres-
sion that the audience is seeing the comedian’s
authentic self rather than a conspicuously false
stage persona. The variables multiply but the
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1. There are two general internalist approaches. Ei-
ther humor is defined directly as having cognitive and
phenomenological components, or it is defined by way
of amusement where amusement is defined by cogni-
tive and phenomenological components (Morreall 2009;
Carroll 2013, 2014a; Hurley, Dennett, and Adams 2011;
Roberts 2019).
2. There is a level of finesse to be added here to do
with humor that is not meant to be consumed in social set-
tings, like the humor in novels. While the humor is meant
to be enjoyed as humor, the reader is not expected to
openly laugh. This is because laughter is, at its root, a so-
cial signal and so occurs much less often in nonsocial situ-
ations.
3. Trust is also considered to entail risk. In this case, I
take on the risk that my uncle is not actually joking, and is
genuinely asking me how to sell a deaf man a banana.
4. It is also hard to imagine a comedy set being bet-
ter for a comedian stopping a show and carefully explain-
ing how she understands Mexicanness or Jewishness.
5. Special thanks are owed to everyone who took the
time to talk about the inner workings of comedy, espe-
cially Ariel Kagan, Emery Bowden, Andy White, Char-
lie Duncan Saffrey, Poppy Collier, Robin Ince, and Sully
O’Sullivan.
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